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Abstract—Various time-memory tradeoffs attacks for stream
ciphers have been proposed over the years. However, the claimed
success of these attacks assumes the initialisation process of the
stream cipher is one-to-one. Some stream cipher proposals do
not have a one-to-one initialisation process. In this paper, we
examine the impact of this on the success of time-memory-data
tradeoff attacks. Under the circumstances, some attacks are more
successful than previously claimed while others are less. The
conditions for both cases are established.
Index Terms—Stream cipher, Time-Memory-Data Tradeoffs,
state convergence, A5/1, Mixer, ZUC
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern stream cipher applications use a secret key and a
publicly known initialisation vector (IV) to form an initial
internal state before keystream generation begins. This is
commonly used in secure communications, where a single
communication in frame-based applications can consist of
multiple frames. A communication will use a single master
key and each frame in the communication will be encrypted
using that key and a distinct IV. For example, a mobile phone
conversation is divided into many frames. Each frame in the
communication is encrypted separately using the same master
key and using the frame number as the IV. The initial state for
each frame formed from the master key and IV is referred to as
a session key. Given a suitable state size (at least equal to the
sum of the key and IV lengths), a good initialisation process
should ensure that each key-IV pair generates a session key
and hence a distinct keystream.
State convergence in a keystream generator occurs when
two distinct internal states generate the same next state.
State convergence can occur either during initialisation, during
keystream generation, or both. For the stream ciphers A5/1 [8],
Mixer [9] and ZUC [10], analysis reveals that the keystream
generators of each of these stream ciphers experience state
convergence [11]–[14]. This occurs only during initialisa-
tion for Mixer but during both initialisation and keystream
generation for A5/1 [13]. Where state convergence occurs
during initialisation, the same keystream will be produced
from different key-IV pairs.
A generic technique in stream cipher cryptanalysis is the
time-memory-data tradeoff (TMDT) attack. TMDT attacks
were first used to attack block ciphers by Hellman [1] and
later adapted for stream cipher cryptanalysis by Babbage [2]
and Golic´ [3]. Additional TMDT attacks on stream ciphers are
proposed by Biryukov and Shamir [4], Hong and Sarkar [5],
[6], and Dunkelman and Keller [7]. n this paper, we discuss
the effectiveness of TMDT attacks when applied to keystream
generators for which state convergence occurs, particularly
with respect to the type of state convergence that occurs.
This paper is organised as follows. Section II gives a brief
introduction to the initialisation and keystream generation
process of keystream generators and reviews common TMDT
on stream ciphers. Section III discusses the effect state conver-
gence has on TMDT master and session key recovery attacks.
Section IV concludes this paper and proposes possible areas
for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Initialisation and keystream generation process
Keystream generators for stream ciphers operate by main-
taining an internal state and applying update and output
functions to the state. The state of a keystream generator is of
size s bits. Modern keystream generators take two inputs: a
master key and an IV, of size k and v bits, respectively. Thus,
a key-IV pair has a total length of k+v bits. Before keystream
generation commences, a key-IV pair is used to form an initial
internal state value. This process is referred to as initialisation
and can be considered as a mapping from binary vectors of
length k + v to those of length s.
The initialisation process is often performed in three phases:
key-loading, IV-loading and the diffusion phase. In the key-
loading and IV-loading phases, the master key and IV are
transferred to the keystream generator’s state. When both the
master key and IV have been transferred, the stream cipher is
in its “loaded state”. If s < k+ v, key and IV loading results
in state compression and consequently, the total number of
distinct keystreams is less than the total number of key-IV
pairs. If s ≥ k + v, the loading process potentially provides
2k+v distinct loaded states.
Following this, the diffusion phase begins. This is generally
the most complex phase of the initialisation process and it is
important, as using the loaded state directly to begin keystream
generation could make the stream cipher vulnerable to corre-
lation or algebraic attacks. The diffusion phase consists of a
number of iterations of the initialisation state-update function.
Each iteration of the initialisation state-update function can be
considered as a function which maps the state space to itself.
This mapping should be one-to-one and nonlinear in nature.
After the initialisation process is complete, the keystream
generator is said to be in an initial state. Let I be the
total number of distinct initial states. If s ≥ k + v and the
initialisation process is well-designed, I = 2k+v . If I < 2k+v ,
state convergence has occurred during initialisation.
Once the keystream generator is in its initial state, the
keystream generation phase begins. To generate keystream,
a state-update function is applied to the internal state of
the stream cipher and an output function is applied to this
internal state. This state-update function can be either be the
same function used in the initialisation phase or a different
function. An example of a stream cipher which uses the same
state-update function for both initialisation and keystream
generation is A5/1 [8], while Mixer [9] is an example of a
stream cipher which uses a different state-update function for
initialisation and keystream generation.
To prevent TMDT attacks, it is recommended that modern
stream ciphers have an internal state size which is greater or
equal to k + v, where v ≥ 1.5k [7]. Since the state space
is at least the size of the space spanned by a key-IV pair, it
is reasonable to expect that the initialisation process will be
one-to-one, that is, each distinct key-IV pair should map to a
distinct state at the end of initialisation.
B. Review of some time-memory-data tradeoff attacks
The goal of TMDT attacks is to recover either the session
key, the internal state at a known point in time or the master
key. If the attacker manages to recover the session key of a
keystream generator, they can use it to generate keystream to
decrypt the entire frame. However, the attacker will not be
able to use this session key to decrypt other frames in the
conversation, since these will have been encrypted using the
same master key but a different IV. Master key recovery is
stronger as this allows an attacker to decrypt all other frames
in a conversation.
TMDT attacks are performed in two phases: the pre-
computation phase and the online phase. In the pre-
computation phase, a lookup table is constructed. This table
has two columns. For state recovery, the first column consists
of selected session keys (initial internal states) of the stream
cipher. For master key recovery, the first column consists
of selected master keys (and might also include the IV). In
both scenarios, the second column consists of a segment of
keystream generated using either the corresponding key-IV
pair, session key or internal state. In the online-phase of the
attack, the attacker compares the captured keystream to the
second column of the lookup table. If a match is detected, the
attacker assumes that the obtained session key, internal state
or key-IV pair is correct.
The complexity of a TMDT attack can be described using
a series of variables. D is the amount of data the attacker
needs in the online-phase of the attack to recover the master
key. P is the pre-computation time needed to construct the
lookup table. M is the memory needed to construct and store
the table. During the online phase, the attacker attempts to
recover the session or master key by searching through the
lookup table. The time taken to do the search is denoted by
T . The success of the attack depends on T or M or the sum
of T+M being less than 2k or 2s, depending on the particular
TMDT attack being used. Since P is a one-off operation,
it is assumed that the attacker has already pre-computed the
lookup table beforehand and the time taken for this operation is
not considered when measuring the complexity of the TMDT
attack. In this section, we review the major TMDT attacks on
stream ciphers.
1) Babbage and Golic´.: Babbage [2] and Golic´ [3] inde-
pendently applied the TMDT attacks to stream ciphers. Their
session key recovery attack is referred to as the BG attack in
the remainder of this paper.
In the pre-computation phase, an attacker selects either M
different session keys or internal states. For each of these, the
attacker produces some keystream of length s. The attacker
then stores the session key-keystream pair in a lookup table,
sorted according to the keystream.
In the real-time phase of the attack, the attacker takes a
segment of keystream of length D + log s − 1 they have
captured and uses a sliding-window to produce all D possible
keystream sub-strings of length s. The attacker then searches
the lookup table to see if any of these substrings match. If there
is a match, the session key corresponding to the keystream
sub-string is considered to be the session key which generated
the captured keystream. If the TMDT satisfies the following
equations
T ·M = 2s with P = M (1)
the attack complexity is less than that of exhaustive keysearch.
To provide resistance to this attack, both Babbage and Golic´
recommend that the size of the internal state of the stream
cipher should be at least twice the key size.
2) Biryukov and Shamir.: Biryukov and Shamir [4] com-
bine the concepts of Hellman’s TMDT attack on block ci-
phers [1] and the BG attack to provide a more efficient TMDT
attack on stream ciphers. Their session key recovery attack is
referred to as the BS attack for the remainder of this paper.
The pre-computation phase of the BS attack is similar to
Hellman’s pre-computation phase. The attacker defines a func-
tion f , which generates the keystream in the stream cipher. The
attacker also chooses random permutations to take place of the
function h. h is a function which maps the s-bit state to another
s-bit state. The attacker defines g = h ◦ f and creates lookup
tables using Hellman’s lookup table construction method. In
the online phase, the attacker uses any instance c in the D
keystreams obtained and iteratively applies g to h(c) until the
s-bit value h(c) matches a entry in the second column of the
lookup table. Once a match is found, the session key which
generated the keystream is recovered using the method used
in Hellman’s online phase attack. The tradeoff curve of the
BS attack is given by:
T ·M2 ·D2 = 22s with P = 2
2s
D
and 1 ≤ D2 ≤ T (2)
The BS attack reiterates the importance that the size of the
internal state of a keystream generator needed to be at least
twice the master key size so that TMD tradeoffs are worse
than exhaustive keysearch.
3) Hong and Sarkar.: Hong and Sarkar’s TMDT attack [5],
[6] aims to recover the master key, as opposed to recovering
the internal state or session key in the earlier attacks. Their
master key recovery attack will be referred to as the HS attack
for the remainder of this paper.
In the pre-computation phase of the HS attack, the attacker
first chooses random key-IV pairs, storing the master key and
the IV in the first column of the lookup table. For each key-
IV pair, the attacker generates a keystream of length k + v
bits. The tradeoff curve from the HS attack is the same as BS
curve, but instead of it being an internal-state to keystream
mapping, the HS attack uses a key-IV to keystream mapping:
T = M = 22(k+v) with D = 2
1
4 (k+v) (3)
Thus, if the attacker has access to D = 2
1
4 (k+v) bits of
keystream, the attacker can recover the master key with a time
and memory complexity of T = M = 2
1
2 (k+v). If v < k, the
complexity of the attack is less than exhaustive key search.
In order to resist the HS attack, Hong and Sarkar recommend
that the IV size is at least as long as that of the master key.
4) Dunkelman and Keller.: The TMDT attack by Dunkel-
man and Keller [7], referred hereafter as the DK attack is
a master key recovery attack. In the DK attack, an attacker
constructs lookup tables for chosen IVs. This approach is
different from the HS attack, where each lookup table would
consist of arbitrary IVs. Constructing lookup tables for each
IV allows the attacker to take advantage of the fact the IV is
a publicly known value.
By constructing tables for specific IVs, the following trade-
off curve is obtained.
T ·M2 ·D2 = 22(k+v) (4)
Note that this is the same tradeoff curve as the HS and BS
attack. However, because of the IV table-based approach, this
approach does not use multiple keystreams and hence, imposes
no restrictions on the parameters. Therefore, even for T =
M = D, the complexity of the attack is less than exhaustive
key search as long as 22v < 23k. That is, a stream cipher
would be resistant to the DK attack if the v ≥ 1.5k.
III. STATE CONVERGENCE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS ON
TMD TRADEOFF ATTACKS
Recent analysis of several stream ciphers, namely A5/1 [8],
Mixer [9] and ZUC [10], revealed that the initialisation pro-
cesses are not one-to-one. For A5/1 and Mixer, the choice of
state-update functions means that the number of distinct initial
states decreases as the number of iterations of the state-update
function increases [3], [11], [13]. There are three possible
scenarios for state convergence in keystream generators. They
are:
Scenario 1. The same master key used with different
IVs generates the same initial state.
Scenario 2. The same IV used with different master
keys generates the same initial state.
Scenario 3. Distinct key-IV pairs generate the same
initial state.
We now analyse the effect state convergence has on the success
of session key recovery and master key recovery TMDT
attacks. A summary of our findings can be found in Table I.
Table entries are either a 4 or ?, where a 4 means an attacker
can be confident that the session key or master key they
recovered is correct, while a ? means there is the possibility
that the attacker has not recovered the correct master key.
A. Effect on TMDT attacks on stream ciphers.
1) Session key recovery.: The lookup tables for session key
TMDT attacks are constructed so that an attacker can recover
the session key for a particular keystream. If the captured
keystream can be found in the lookup table, the attacker
can use the corresponding session key to generate sufficient
keystream to decrypt the entire encrypted frame.
An alternative to session key recovery is the internal state
recovery TMDT attack. An internal state TMDT attack re-
covers the internal state of a keystream generator at a known
point in time during keystream generation. The process used
in internal state recovery TMDT attacks is similar to session
key recovery. Note that although the process is the same,
there is the possibility that internal state recovery attacks can
only recover a portion of the frame, compared to session
key recovery’s ability to decrypt the entire frame. We only
consider session key recovery in this section, although in some
cases it might actually be the internal state that the attacker is
recovering.
State convergence has a positive impact on the success of
attacks aimed at session key recovery. If an attacker recovers
the session key, they will be able to correctly decrypt the entire
frame. It does not matter which key-IV pair generated the
session key, since the definition of state convergence, multiple
key-IV pairs can generate the same session key. Hence, the
three different scenarios described have the same outcome
with respect to the success or failure of TMDT attacks which
recover session keys. However, since the attacker does not
know the master key that was used, they will not be able to
decrypt other frames in the communication and will need to
perform the online phase of the TMDT attack again in order to
decrypt these. If the number of distinct session keys I is such
that I < 2k+v , the tradeoff equation in Equation 2 will result
in reduced time, memory and data requirements if the attacker
is aware of this and constructs the lookup table accordingly.
We now present an example of how this reduced session key
size may have a positive effect on session key recovery on an
actual cipher which has the state convergence problem. Mixer
is an example of stream cipher which uses different state-
update functions for initialisation and keystream generation.
Key recovery Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Session key recovery 4 4 4
Master key recovery HS: 4 ? HS: 4DK: 4 DK: 4
TABLE I
SUMMARY TABLE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TMDT ATTACKS.
Original tradeoffs New tradeoffs
192 bits 191 bits 109 bits
T 296 295.50 254.50
M 296 295.50 254.50
D 248 247.75 227.25
TABLE II
ORIGINAL AND NEW TRADEOFFS FOR MIXER USING BIRYUKOV AND
SHAMIR’S TRADEOFF EQUATION
Mixer uses a 128-bit master key and a 64-bit IV to initialise
a 217-bit internal state. Teo et al. [13] estimate that the total
number of distinct session keys after all possible key-IV pairs
undergoes the initialisation phase to be bounded by 2191 and
2108.99.
Applying Equation 2 without taking into account state
convergence gives the following tradeoff: T = M = 296, and
D = 248. This constitutes an attack on Mixer. The bounds
when the total number of distinct session keys is 2191–2109
can be seen in Table II. In both cases, the time, memory,
and data complexities may see significant reductions in time,
memory, and data complexities.
2) Master Key Recovery and Scenario 1.: When a single
master key and different IVs generate the same keystream, the
HS attack can recover the correct master key if that key-IV pair
was one of those selected for the construction of the lookup
table. This is the case regardless of whether the state-update
function used during initialisation and keystream generation is
the same function or a different one. After the online phase
of the TMDT attack, an attacker can check that the recovered
IV is the same as that captured along with the keystream. If
it is the same IV, the attacker can be confident that they have
recovered the correct master key and can use that master key
with other IVs to decrypt other frames in the communication.
If the IV does not match the one recorded in the table, the
attacker knows that they have recovered the wrong master key
and would need to perform the online phase of the attack
again.
A similar process happens in the DK attack. In the online
phase, the attacker uses the appropriate IV-based lookup table
and checks if there is a match on the captured keystream.
If there is a match, the corresponding master key is the
correct master key which generated the captured keystream.
The attacker can then use that same master key with other
IVs to decrypt other encrypted frames in the communication.
We now present an example of how this reduced master
key size may have a positive effect on master key TMDT
attacks on an actual cipher which has the state convergence
problem. The ZUC stream cipher uses a 128-bit master key
and a 128-bit IV. The keystream generator has a total state
space of s = 560 bits. Since k = v = 128 bits and k+v < s2 ,
ZUC is resistant to most forms of TMDT attack except the
DK attack, if state convergence is not taken into account. The
tradeoffs for the HS and DK attack without taking into account
the state convergence issue are T = M = 2128 and D = 264
; and T = M = D = 2102.4 respectively. Wu et al. [14] note
that ZUC had Scenario 1 state convergence. Consequently, the
effective master key size is potentially reduced to 66 or 100
bits, depending on which differential attack was used. As Wu
et al. made no mention of the effective IV size as a result of
the state convergence, we assume that the effective IV size is
still 128 bits. The new tradeoffs can be seen in Table III.
As can be seen from the new tradeoff equations, consid-
ering the state convergence, the ZUC stream cipher is now
vulnerable to the HS attack. Furthermore, both the HS and
DK attack now have significant reductions in time, memory
and data requirements.
3) Master Key Recovery and Scenario 2.: Where the same
keystream is generated by different master keys for any given
IVs, the attacker does not have the confidence that master key
they recovered is the correct one.
Let us assume that three master keys, K1, K2 and K3,
with the same IV, V 1, produce the same keystream and two
master keys, K2 and K3 were used for the construction of
the lookup table. The original frame was encrypted with the
K1-V 1 key-IV pair. During the online phase of the attack, the
attacker recovers the two keys K2 and K3, that with IV V 1
will produce the same keystream. If an attacker, incorrectly
assuming that K2 was the actual master key, tries to use K2
to decrypt other frames, it should not be successful, since K2
with a different IV V 2 will most likely not generate the same
keystream as would have been generated by the K1-V 2 pair.
Since K1 was not selected during the construction of the
lookup table, the master key recovery TMDT attack in this
scenario is equivalent to session key recovery. For the attack
to succeed, the attacker has to hope that the correct master key
was selected during the construction of the lookup table. If the
correct master key was not used, the attacker will not be able
to decrypt other encrypted frames in a single conversation.
HS New HS DK New DK
128 bits 100 bits 66 bits 128 bits 100 bits 66 bits
T 2128 2114 297 2102.4 291.2 277.6
M 2128 2114 297 2102.4 291.2 277.6
D 264 257 248.5 2102.4 291.2 277.6
TABLE III
ORIGINAL AND NEW TRADEOFFS FOR ZUC V1.4
If γ is the number of master keys an attacker obtains at
the end of the online phase of the attack and , with  < V ,
being the effective IV size of the stream cipher, the HS and
DK tradeoff curve would be
(T + γ) ·M2 ·D2 = 22(k+) (5)
The memory and data requirements however, remain the same
as would have been obtained in Equation 2. However, since
γ possible master keys can now appear in the lookup table,
an attacker needs to try, on average, γ2 keys with other IVs
before they can be certain if the master key they are currently
trying is correct.
If a keystream generator uses the same state-update function
for initialisation and keystream generation, it can be viewed
as a keystream generator which performs an extended version
of the initialisation process to generate keystream. Hence, if
the segment of keystream used during the construction of
the lookup table matched a segment of keystream which was
capture not from the beginning of keystream generation, the
number of possible master keys which could have generated
the keystream with the particular IV can increase. Therefore, a
successful TMDT master key recovery attack with keystream
generator which use the same state-update function for both
initialisation and keystream generation can be less likely than
an attack on a keystream generator which uses a different state-
update function for initialisation and keystream generation.
4) Master Key Recovery and Scenario 3.: Where the
keystream is generated by different key-IV pairs, during the
online phase an attacker will know if they have recovered the
correct master key based on the publicly known IV. If τ and
, with τ < 2k and  < 2v , are the effective master key and
IV size respectively, the tradeoff curve would be
T ·M2 ·D2 = 22(τ+) (6)
Similar to Scenario 1, since the attacker knows the IV used to
generate the captured keystream and assuming the master key
used to generate the captured keystream was used during the
construction of the lookup table, the attacker can be confident
that the master key they recover during the online phase of the
TMDT attack is the correct one. Furthermore, since τ < 2k
and  < 2v , the HS and DK attacks will be less than exhaustive
master key search.
Biryukov et al.’s [12] TMDT attack on A5/1 describes an
attack which is able to recover the master key in a few minutes
at most. The most expensive cost of this attack is the pre-
computation complexity, which they calculated to be
P = M ·
√
T = 248
where M = 236, T = 224, and 248 is the total number of initial
states which will produce a certain 16-bit output prefix (264×
2−16). The estimates provided by Teo et al.’s [13] indicates
the possibility that the number of distinct initial states at the
end of A5/1’s diffusion phase to be 19.2/100× 264 ≈ 261.62
due to state convergence. Using this new estimate, the pre-
computation complexity of Biryukov et al’s attack is reduced
to 261.62 × 2−16 = 245.62. This in turn, potentially reduces
the time and memory requirements to be M = 235 and T =
221.24.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.
This paper has analysed how state convergence could affect
the effectiveness of TMDT attacks. In the case of session key
TMDT attacks, an attacker potentially needs to guess a smaller
set of session keys than what was originally intended by the
designers of the stream cipher, since not all distinct key-IV
pairs generate a distinct initial state. This could result in less
time, data and memory requirements needed for the session
key TMDT attacks to succeed than previously estimated by the
designers of the stream cipher. The disadvantage of session key
recovery TMDT attacks is if the attacker wanted to decrypt
other encrypted frames in the communication, they would need
to re-run the TMDT attack for each frame. If the attacker
were to repeatedly use session key recovery TMDT attacks to
decrypt multiple frames, it can be less efficient than master
key recovery TMDT attacks.
For master key recovery TMDT attacks, the success of
the attacks depend on the type of scenario, as outlined in
Section III. Unless the convergence is such that different
master keys with the same IV produce the same session key, an
attacker who recovers a master key can check if the associated
IV value matches that which was observed along with the
keystream. If the IV value is the same, the attacker can be
confident that they have recovered the correct key. However,
if state convergence was such that it was possible that multiple
distinct master keys with the same IV generate the same
keystream, there is a possibility that the master key recovered
by the attacker during the online phase of the TMDT attack
is not the correct master key. In this case, it is likely that
the attacker can only decrypt a single frame and master key
TMDT attacks maybe less effective than claimed. The attacker
can only be confident that they have actually recovered the
correct master key if they can use it to decrypt the contents
of all the frames in the communication.
In this paper, we included examples of ciphers which
experience state convergence. The implementation of TMDT
attacks on these ciphers to verify the expected reductions in
time, memory and data requirements remains future work.
Additionally, we plan to investigate other stream ciphers with
potential state convergence problems.
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